In particular, the EU-Turkey agreement was cited as an example of how secure agreements with third countries can deter newcomers. In fact, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin McAleenan did so during a recent speech by the Senate Judiciary Committee. While the AGREEMENT between the EU and Turkey was probably correlated with a drop in flows, other factors, which had nothing to do with the security provisions of third-country nationals, were more responsible. In particular, the interception of migrant boats in the Aegean Sea by the Turkish coast guard, another element of the agreement, probably had a much greater effect. According to the Turkish Interior Ministry, more than 79,000 migrants and refugees were intercepted in the first four months of 2019 while trying to reach Greece, eclipsing the number of people who returned under the safe third country agreement. The United States has another such agreement, a 2002 agreement with Canada. A number of practical obstacles prevented transfers. First, this regime is based on evidence that an asylum seeker has crossed the safe country. This can be relatively simple in formal ports of entry between two countries, as border guards can visually confirm the previous presence of an asylum seeker in the third country. If transit between ports of entry is carried out or if the safe third country does not share a common border with the planned country of asylum, further proof of transit is required. The agreement between the United States and Canada, for example, was limited to formal ports of entry because evidence, in this case visual confirmation, was required as to how asylum seekers entered Canada. Faced with an increase in the number of people travelling back and forth between ports of entry and seeking asylum, Canada has requested an extension of the agreement, as the Canadian asylum authorities` information-sharing protocols would allow access to biometric data from the United States (for example).
B visa applications) that may confirm the previous presence of an asylum seeker in the United States. Panama. U.S. officials are also interested in reaching an agreement with Panama, through which thousands of asylum seekers from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean transit as they attempt to reach the United States. While secure agreements from third countries appear on paper to offer the potential to discourage new asylum applications and speed up asylum procedures, experience shows that these could be false promises. The reality is that these rules have generally proved difficult to implement, not rusty, discouraging new applications, and that procedures for already overburdened asylum systems have been expanded to new complexities. Safe agreements on third parties are an integral part of asylum schemes in other parts of the world. So far, the approach between EU Member States has been most widely applied by the Dublin Regulation, which assigns responsibility for processing asylum applications to the Member State in which an asylum seeker has entered.
But there are other examples. Canada and the United States signed such an agreement in 2002. More recently, Norway unilaterally made Russia a safe third country in 2015 in response to the growing influx of asylum seekers to its northern border. And in 2016, the European Union negotiated an agreement with Turkey that allows asylum seekers arriving in Greece, especially Syrians, to return to Turkey to seek refuge. The administration insists that several new agreements be reached on the security of third-country nationals: the so-called “first country of asylum” principle often justifies the decision to return asylum seekers to another country. This means that a country can refuse a person`s asylum application if they have already been protected by another country. It is also often referred to as the “safe third country” principle. This broader term includes other relationships between an asylum seeker and a third country where they are considered safe.